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Impeaching the Accused with Prior
Convictions: Does Proposition 8 Put
Beagle in the Doghouse?
On June 8, 1982, California voters passed Proposition 8, known
as the "Victim's Bill of Rights."' The scope of Proposition 8 is so
broad that it represents the most dramatic change in criminal justice
procedures the people of this state have ever seen.2 The provision
amended the California Constitution and significantly modified the
Penal, Evidence, and Welfare and Institutions Codes. Perhaps the
most significant changes are those made in the Evidence Code. The
"truth-in-evidence" section of Proposition 8 provides that "relevant
evidence shall not be excluded in any criminal proceeding." ' 3 This sec-
tion renders a large portion of the Evidence Code ineffective' and
virtually eliminates the exclusionary rule.'
Another provision of Proposition 8 affecting the Evidence Code
is section 28, subdivision (f) of the California Constitution.6 This sub-
division provides that "[a]ny prior felony conviction of any person
in any criminal proceeding, whether adult or juvenile, shall subse-
quently be used without limitation for purposes of impeachment.... -"
The primary intent of the voters in adopting subdivision (f) was to
overrule the California Supreme Court case of People v. Beagle.8
Beagle gave the trial court authority to exclude evidence of prior felony
convictions offered for impeachment purposes when the probative value
of the evidence is outweighed by the risk of undue prejudice. 9 In light
of the adoption of subdivision (f), the current status of California
law concerning the impeachment of witnesses with prior felony con-
victions is unsettled. Until the courts construe this new provision, the
full meaning and effect of subdivision (f) will remain unclear.
1. L.A. Daily J., Sept. 7, 1982, at 1, col. 2.
2. Schrag, Crime on the Ballot, THE NEw REPU BLc, June 2, Vol. 186, 1982, at 10.
3. CAL. CONST. art. I, §28(d).
4. Legislation by Senator Barry Keene would have provided that all provisions of the
Evidence Code, with the exception of a provision restricting the use of prior felony convictions
to attack the credibility of a witness, shall control the admission of evidence in criminal pro-
ceedings. This legislation, however, died in committee.
5. See Schrag, supra note 2, at 10.
6. CAL. CoNsT. art. I, §28(0.
7. Id.
8. See infra notes 71-142 and accompanying text.
9. 6 Cal. 3d 441, 452-53, 492 P.2d 1, 8, 99 Cal. Rptr. 313, 320 (1972).
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The purpose of this comment is to analyze and interpret subdivision (f)
to resolve some of the uncertainty created by this provision. This com-
ment will begin with a discussion of the theory underlying the use
of character evidence to attack the credibility of a witness. Generally,
any witness is subject to impeachment, including the accused who
testifies in his own behalf. Unlike other witnesses, however, impeaching
the accused with character evidence involves special considerations.
The position of a defendant witness differs from an ordinary witness
because the trier of fact determines his guilt or innocence as a defen-
dant, as well as his credibility as a witness. When evidence of the
accused's bad character is introduced to impeach his credibility, the
jury may be unable or unwilling to limit use of the evidence to the
issue of credibility. Instead, the jury may use the evidence for the
improper purpose of determining the defendant's guilt. In this com-
ment, the author will explore the potential for, and source of, this
forbidden prejudice. The author then will continue with an interpreta-
tion of subdivision (f). This interpretation will employ well-settled rules
of cQnstitutional construction to show that the primary effect of sub-
division (f) is to overrule People v. Beagle, thereby removing the discre-
tion of the trial court to exclude evidence of prior felony convictions
when the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed
by the risk of undue prejudice.
Finally, this comment will address the impact that divesting the trial
court of its discretion has on the constitutionality of impeaching the
accused with his prior felony convictions. Due process requires the
presence of procedures adequate to protect the defendant's right to
a fair trial. The author will show that prior convictions may not con-
stitutionally be used to impeach the defendant's credibility in a criminal
trial without judicial discretion to exclude evidence of extremely pre-
judicial prior convictions. Before discussing the constitutional issues,
however, the theory of character evidence and the potential for pre-
judice that exists when the accused is impeached must be understood.
THE THEORY OF CHARACTER EVIDENCE
A logical starting point for a discussion of character evidence is
with the definition of "character" itself. Although the term has been
variously defined, character is generally understood to involve a moral
quality, implying something good or bad about a person. A noted
10. Kuhns, The Propensity to Misunderstand the Character of Specific Acts Evidence, 66
IOWA L. REv. 777, 779 (1981).
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scholar in the field defines character as the "generalized description
of one's disposition . . . in respect to a general trait, such as honesty,
temperance, or peacefulness.""
At trial, a person's character may be "in issue."' 2 For example,
in a suit for defamation, the plaintiff places his character in issue.' 3
As a defense, the defendant may offer evidence of the plaintiff's bad
character.' 4 In other situations, however, character is not "in issue,"
but is offered as circumstantial evidence of conduct. 15 Evidence may
be introduced that A robbed X; therefore, an inference is that A has
a dishonest character. From this view of A's character, a logical in-
ference is that A acted pursuant to this character and committed the
crime charged.' 6 Although character is always logically relevant to
prove conduct consistent with that character, 7 certain rules of exclu-
sion have developed.' 8 In California, for example, the general rule
is that evidence of a criminal defendant's character is inadmissible
to prove his conduct on a specified occasion. 19 Thus, the prosecution
may not offer evidence that the accused has been convicted of a crime
for the purpose of proving he committed the crime for which he is
on trial.2" In the above example, then, evidence of A's prior robbery
conviction would be excluded. The purpose of this rule is to protect
the innocent defendant from being found guilty of the present charge
based on his past crimes. 2' The introduction of prior convictions places
tremendous pressure on the jury to convict the accused, not because
he is guilty of the present charge, but because his prior record justifies
his incarceration, regardless of his guilt or innocence. 22 One legal
scholar has recognized that "the deep tendency of human nature is
to punish, not because the accused is guilty, but because he is a bad
man and may well be condemned now that he is caught." ' 23
Article I, section 28, subdivision (f) of the California Constitution
is an exception24 to the general rule that character evidence may not be
11. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 462 (1972).
12. See generally Hale, Some Comments on Character Evidence and Related Topics, 22
So. CAL. L. Rav., 341, 341-44 (1949).
13. See id. at 342.
14. See id.
15. Id. at 341.
16. vxotMoRE, EVIDENCE, §192 (1940).
17. Hale, supra note 12, at 346.
18. See generally, Kuhn, supra note 10, at 780-81.
19. CAL. Evm. CODE §1101.
20. See id.
21. People v. Lapin, 138 Cal. App. 2d 251, 259, 291 P.2d 575, 581 (1956).
22. WIGMORE, supra note 16, §57, at 454.
23. WvIGMORE, supra note 16, §230.
24. Prior to the adoption of article I, §28(f) of the California Constitution, CAL. Evm.
CODE §1101(c) provided the same exception.
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used as proof of a person's conduct.2" This provision makes prior
felony convictions of a witness admissible for purposes of impeaching
the credibility of that witness. 26 For example, the impeaching party
may introduce evidence that the witness has previously been convicted
of issuing a check with insufficient funds. The jury could infer that
the witness is deceitful, and therefore conclude that the witness is
likely to tell a false story while testifying. This exception also applies
when the witness being impeached is the accused. If the defendant
takes the stand, his prior convictions will be admitted, not as evidence
of his present guilt, but as evidence to aid the trier of fact in assess-
ing the defendant's credibility. 27 Inherent in the use of prior convic-
tions to impeach criminal defendants, however, is the danger that the
jury will be unable to restrict its use of the evidence to the issue of
credibility. 28 Instead, the jury may infer that the defendant is guilty
of the crime charged. 29 Also, the jury may conclude improperly that
the defendant has a criminal disposition and should be incarcerated
for that reason alone." ° Convicting a person on either theory is legally
impermissible. 3 This danger exists despite instructions to the jury that
evidence of a defendant's prior crimes must be limited to the issue
of credibility.3 2
The tendency of the jury to misuse this kind of evidence derives
in part from the similarity of the inferential chains. Consequently,
whether the evidence is used to prove that the accused committed
the crime charged, or to undermine his credibility, the jury is invited
to infer that the accused is dishonest, deceitful, or otherwise possesses
a "bad character." Thus, even when the jury is instructed to limit
its use of the evidence to the issue of credibility, an intermediate step
in the inferential chain requires the jurors to form an unfavorable
opinion of the defendant's character. Only the most disciplined juror
could prevent this from influencing his determination of the facts.
Courts and legislatures recognize the danger that the jury will be
unable to restrict its use of prior convictions to the issue of credibility."
Consequently, procedures to protect the defendant from this danger
25. CAL. EvID. CODE §1101.
26. See CAL. CoNsT., art. I, §28(f).
27. Note, To Take the Stand or not To Take the Stand: The Dilemma of the Defendant
with a Criminal Record, 4 CoLIJm. L. J. & Soc. PROBS. 215, 215 (1968).
28. See McCoalmcic, supra note 11, at 89 (1972).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See id.
32. Id.
33. See, e.g., FED. R. Evm. 609(a).
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have developed. For example, under the Federal Rules of Evidence,
a witness may be impeached with evidence of his prior felony
convictions.3" The prosecution, however, must establish that the pro-
bative value of the evidence substantially outweighs the possibility of
undue prejudice; otherwise, the evidence will be excluded.35 Califor-
nia courts have also developed safeguards to protect the defendant
from being convicted based on his criminal record." In 1972 the
California Supreme Court decided People v. Beagle.3 7 That case gave
the trial court discretion to exclude evidence of prior convictions when
the potential for unfair prejudice outweighed the probative value.38 The
following section discusses this important case.
PEOPLE V. BEAGLE
Until the seminal case of People v. Beagle,39 any prior felony con-
viction was admissible to impeach the credibility of any witness, in-
cluding the defendant." At that time, California Evidence Code sec-
tion 788 controlled the admissibility of felony convictions offered for
impeachment purposes. Section 788 provided: "For the purpose of
attacking the credibility of a witness, it may be shown by the ex-
amination of the witness, or by the record of the judgment that he
has been convicted of a felony.... -41 In Beagle, the court addressed
the relationship between Evidence Code sections 788 and 352.42 Sec-
tion 352 authorizes the trial judge to exercise discretion and exclude
evidence that is particularly prejudicial. 43 The court held that these
two code sections, when read together, provided the trial judge
with discretion to exclude evidence of prior felony convictions when
their probative value on the issue of credibility was substantially
outweighed by the risk of undue prejudice. 44
The analysis of the court focused upon the language of section 788. 45
The court interpreted the use by the legislature of the permissive word
"may," rather than the mandatory word "shall," as evidence of an
intent that the trial court is not obliged in every instance to admit
34. See id.
35. Id.
36. See, e.g., 6 Cal. 3d at 452-53, 492 P.2d at 8, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 320.
37. Id. at 441, 492 P.2d at 1, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 313.
38. Id. at 452-53, 492 P.2d at 8, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 320.
39. Id. at 441, 492 P.2d at 1, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 313.
40. See id. at 451-52, 492 P.2d at 7, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 319.
41. CAL. EviD. CODE §788.
42. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
43. See CAL. Evro. CoDE §352.
44. 6 Cal. 3d at 452-53, 492 P.2d at 8, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 320.
45. See id. at 451-53, 492 P.2d at 7-8, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 319-20.
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evidence of prior crimes." The court concluded that section 352 ap-
plied to Evidence Code section 788; therefore, the trial court possessed
discretion to exclude evidence of prior felony convictions.47 To sup-
port this interpretation of Evidence Code sections 788 and 352, the
court relied on the case of Luck v. United States." The Luck court
recognized that the jury, despite limiting instructions, was likely to
consider evidence of the accused's prior crimes in determining the
issue of guilt or innocence. 49 In these circumstances, the court held
that the trial court may, in its discretion, exclude the evidence to protect
the interests of the accused.5 0 The Beagle court refused to establish
rigid standards to govern the introduction of prior felony convictions.'
The trial courts were to have discretion concerning the admissibility
of prior convictions.5 2 To aid the trial courts in exercising this discre-
tion, however, the court outlined a number of factors to be considered:
(1) the relevancy of the prior conviction to the honesty and integrity
of the witness; (2) the proximity in time of the prior conviction to
the crime charged; (3) the similarity between the prior conviction and
the present criminal charge; and (4) the effect on the administration of
justice should the defendant, fearing jury prejudice, choose not to
testify.53
By vesting the trial court with discretion, the Beagle court imposed
substantial limitations on the use of prior felony convictions to im-
peach the credibility of a witness.5 4 While Beagle did not preclude
the admission of prior convictions, cases that followed Beagle cir-
cumscribed the discretion of the trial court to admit prior felonies."5
For example, in People v. Rist s6 the California Supreme Court ruled
that prior convictions may not be introduced to attack the defendant's
credibility if the prior convictions are similar to the offense charged
and other dissimilar convictions are available."1 In a subsequent case,
the Supreme Court clarified the meaning of the Rist decision 8 and
held that the absence in a particular case of dissimilar prior convic-
46. Id. at 452, 492 P.2d at 7, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 319.
47. Id.
48. 348 F.2d 763 (D.C. 1965).
49. Id. at 768, n.8.
50. Id.
51. 6 Cal. 3d at 453, 492 P.2d at 8, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 320.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 453-54, 492 P.2d at 8-9, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 320-21.
54. See id. at 451-54, 492 P.2d at 7-9, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 319-21.
55. See infra notes 56-64 and accompanying text.
56. 16 Cal. 3d 211, 545 P.2d 833, 127 Cal. Rptr. 457 (1976).
57. See id. at 220-21, 545 P.2d at 839, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 463.
58. People v. Fries, 24 Cal. 3d 222, 230-31, 594 P.2d 19, 25, 155 Cal. Rptr. 194, 200 (1974).
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tions did not automatically justify the admission of similar or iden-
tical priors. s9 The court established a rigid rule that prior convictions
similar or identical to the offense charged are per se inadmissible to
impeach the defendant's credibility.6" This rule circumscribed the discre-
tion of the trial court to admit evidence of prior convictions. The
California Supreme Court imposed further limitations on the exercise
of discretion in People v. Antick,6' when the court held that the
remoteness of a conviction significantly detracts from its probative
value.62 Antick is important because it represents the willingness of
the court to balance the probative value against the prejudicial
effect of the evidence and make an independent determination of
admissibility.63 The decision, therefore, signaled a trend away from
the rule that the decision of the trial court to admit or exclude evidence
of prior felonies was not subject to reversal on appeal."'
The procedural protections announced in Beagle and refined in
subsequent cases, were developed in response to the prejudice that
may exist when a witness, especially the accused, is impeached by
his prior felony convictions.65 Without adequate safeguards, such as
limiting instructions and judicial discretion, this use of prior convic-
tions may deprive the defendant of his right to a fair trial.66 Section
28, subdivision (f), however, removes trial court discretion to exclude
unduly prejudicial prior convictions. 67 The provision implicitly man-
dates the admission of prior convictions whose probative value is
substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice. 68 In light
of the United States Supreme Court case of Spencer v. Texas,69 the
constitutionality of impeaching the accused with his prior felony convic-
tions absent adequate safeguards is questionable.7" Before the consti-
tutional ramifications of subdivision (f) can be discussed, however,
the provision itself must be interpreted.
INTERPRETING THE PROVISION: Beagle Is OVERRULED
Article I, section 28, subdivision (f) of the California Constitution
59. Id.
60. See id.
61. 15 Cal. 3d 79, 539 P.2d 43, 123 Cal. Rptr. 475 (1974).
62. See id. at 99, 539 P.2d at 56, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 488.
63. JEFFERSON, CAL. Evm. BENCHBOOK §22.22 (1972) (1978 Supplement).
64. Id.
65. See supra notes 39-64 and accompanying text.
66. See infra notes 143-207 and accompanying text.
67. See infra notes 71-142 and accompanying text.
68. See infra notes 71-91 and accompanying text.
69. 385 U.S. 554 (1967).
70. Id., see infra notes 143-207 and accompanying text.
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provides in relevant part: "Any prior felony conviction, of any per-
son . . . shall subsequently be used without limitation for purposes
of impeachment .. ."I' The key to interpreting any new law is to
ascertain the intent of the framers.72 Proposition 8 was enacted through
the initiative power of the citizens of California." In this case, then,
the intent of the electorate must be ascertained. 74 The first step in
determining the intent of the voters is to examine the express language
of the provision." When the language is clear and unambiguous, its
plain meaning must be followed.76 Extrinsic aids may be used to in-
terpret a new provision only if the language is ambiguous.77 Subdivi-
sion (f), then, will be interpreted by employing these general rules
of construction. This analysis will show that subdivision (f) overrules
Beagle, divesting the trial court of its discretion to exclude evidence
of unduly prejudicial convictions.
An examination of the language of subdivision (f) reveals that prior
felony convictions "shall" subsequently be used "without limitation"
for purposes of impeachment." Webster's Dictionary defines the word
"shall" as being synonymous with the word "must. ' 79 The term
"shall" is normally used to express a command or exhortation. 0 As
used in a constitutional provision, "shall" generally is considered as
an indication that the provision is mandatory in nature.8' Further-
more, Black's Law Dictionary provides that the use of the word
"shall" usually "excludes the idea of discretion . .. and operates
to impose a duty . . . which may be enforced ... "I The term
"without" is clearly defined as meaning "exempt or free from.""
"Limitation" is defined as "a restriction or restraint imposed from
outside." Accordingly, when these words are joined to form the
phrase "shall subsequently be used without limitation," the meaning
is clear and unambiguous: the use of prior conviction for purposes
of impeachment must be free from restrictions." Thus, the trial court
71. CAL. CONST. art. I, §28(0.
72. United States v. Rosenblum Truck Lines, 315 U.S. 50, 53 (1941).
73. Brosnahan v. Brown, 32 Cal. 3d 236, 240-41, 651 P.2d 276, 276-77, 186 Cal. Rptr.
30, 32-33 (1982).
74. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
75. State Board of Education v. Levit, 52 Cal. 2d 441, 462, 343 P.2d 8, 20 (1959).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See CAL. CoNsT. art. I, §28(0.
79. WEBSTER's Tnmn NEw WORLD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2085 (1971).
80. Id.
81. Chenoweth v. Chambers, 33 Cal. App. 104, 109-10, 164 P. 428, 430-31 (1917).
82. BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 1233 (1979).
83. WERBSTER'S Timm NEw WoRLD INTERNATIONAL DIcTaoNARY 2627 (1971).
84. Id. at 1312.
85. See supra notes 78-84 and accompanying text.
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has received a mandate."' Evidence of prior felony convictions, if of-
fered, must be admitted to impeach the credibility of a witness.17 Under
subdivision (f), the trial court is no longer free to exercise its discre-
tion to exclude prior felony convictions. The exercise of discretion
is tantamount to the imposition of a "restriction," which is expressly
prohibited by the provision."
This conclusion is supported by the overall tone and language of
the provision, which is written in broad, all inclusive terms: "Any
prior felony conviction of any person in any criminal proceeding...
shall subsequently be used without limitation for purposes of impeach-
ment .. ."I (emphasis added). The language of subdivision (f) is
clear. When the words of a constitutional provision are not used in
a technical manner, the voters must be deemed to have adopted the
ordinary meaning of the language.90 The generally understood mean-
ing of the words used in subdivision (f) indicates that no restriction
shall be imposed on the use of prior felony convictions for impeach-
ment purposes. 91 Since Beagle imposed a restriction on the use of prior
felony convictions, the intent of the electorate in adopting subdivi-
sion (f) undoubtedly was to overrule Beagle and remove the limita-
tions that it imposed.
If, contrary to the conclusion of this author, subdivision (f) is found
to be ambiguous, extrinsic evidence may be used in interpreting the
provision. 9 Examples of extrinsic aids available to assist in the inter-
pretation of an ambiguous constitutional amendment are the official
reports of the California Constitution Revision Commission93 and
records of debates.94 Other examples include legislative committee
reports9" and contemporaneous exposition or interpretation of the
provision. 96 Since Proposition 8 was enacted pursuant to the initiative
power of the people of California, rather than by the legislature, these
aids are not available.97 An extrinsic aid that is available, however,
is evidence of the evil intended to be remedied by the provision.98
86. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
87. See supra notes 78-84 and accompanying text.
88. See supra notes 78-84 and accompanying text.
89. See CAL. CONST. art. I., §28(f).
90. In re Quinn 35 Cal. App. 3d 473, 482, 110 Cal. R (1973).
91. See supra notes 78-84 and accompanying text.
92. See Levit, 52 Cal. 2d at 462, 343 P.2d at 20.
93. Mosk v. Superior Court, 25 Cal. 3d 474, 495, 601 P.2d 1030, 1045, 159 Cal. Rptr.
494, 509 (1974).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See Brosnahan v. Brown, 32 Cal. 3d at 256, 651 P.2d at 286, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 42.
98. See In re Quinn, 35 Cal. App. 3d at 483, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 888.
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Moreover, in the case of initiatives, the arguments in support of the
provisions contained in the voter pamphlet may be used to ascertain
the intent of the electorate. 99 Although the voter pamphlet does not
state explicitly that the trial court is not to retain discretion under
subdivision (f), the ballot arguments in support of Proposition 8 are
instructive. 100
These arguments indicate that the passage of Proposition 8 would
result in tougher laws for the criminally accused.1"' Specifically, Pro-
position 8 would overrule decisions of California courts that created
additional rights for criminal defendants and placed more restrictions
on law enforcement officials.102 By ruling that Evidence Code section
352 applied to section 788, the California Supreme Court, in Beagle,
clearly placed significant restrictions on the use of felony convictions
for impeachment.0 3 First, Beagle gave defendants the right to apply
for the exclusion of incriminating evidence."' Second, Beagle had the
effect of restricting the ability of the prosecution to impeach defense
witnesses.0 5 Thus, Proposition 8 was designed in part to overcome
the Beagle decision.'
Another aid that may be employed in interpreting the language of
subdivision (f) is the preamble to article I, section 28 of the Califor-
nia Constitution. The preamble provides an indication of the evils
intended to be remedied: "a matter of grave statewide concern" is
the protection of public safety and the rights of victims.0 7 Clearly,
the evil intended to be remedied is the victimization of innocent citizens.
Broad procedural reforms and the enactment of laws sufficient to
ensure that accused persons are appropriately detained, tried, and
punished are necessary to secure this protection. 10 The pream-
ble further states that these stricter procedures and laws will act to
deter criminal behavior.' 0 9
Subdivision (f) is a procedural reform that provides for unlimited
introduction of a witness' prior felony convictions to impeach his
99. Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 22 Cal. 3d
208, 245-46, 583 P.2d 1281, 1300, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239, 258 (1978).
100. See Proposition 8, Cal. Voter Pamphlet, June 1982, Primary Election, at 32 (Copy
on file at the Pacific Law Journal).
101. Id. at 34.
102. Id.
103. See supra notes 51-64 and accompanying text.
104. See supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text.
105. See supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text.
106. See supra notes 39-44, 100-02 and accompanying text.
107. See CAL. CONST. art. I, §28(a).
108. Id.
109. Id.
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credibility."° Interpreting this provision as divesting the trial court
of its discretion to exclude evidence of prior felony convictions would
act as a deterrent to future criminal behavior. To the extent that the
accused would be subject to impeachment with prior convictions other-
wise excludable under the Beagle rule, the defendant would be deter-
red from future criminal conduct.
A. Interpretation by Analogy
Further examination of the language of subdivision (f) reveals a
clear intent to overrule Beagle."' As previously discussed, the Beagle
decision was based on an interpretation of the language of Evidence
Code section 788.112 Section 788 provides, in part: "For the pur-
pose of attacking the credibility of a witness, it may be shown by
the examination of the witness or by the record of the judgment that
he has been convicted of a felony. ... "I, The court reasoned that
the legislature, in using the permissive word "may" rather than the
mandatory word "shall," intended section 788 to be read with section
352, giving the trial court discretion to exclude highly prejudicial felony
convictions." 4 Subdivision (f), however, is not written in the same
permissive language," 5 but rather in mandatory terms providing that
prior convictions "shall" be admitted."16 This choice of terms is signifi-
cant. By changing the language of the provision controlling the intro-
duction of prior felonies for impeachment purposes, the electorate
removed the very foundation of the Beagle decision." 7
This interpretation of subdivision (f) is not unique. A similar situa-
tion occurred in the District of Columbia. In Luck v. United States, "'
a court was faced with the task of interpreting a District of Colum-
bia statute providing that the prior convictions of a witness "may
be given in evidence to affect his credibility.""' The Luck court
focused on the language of the statute and held that the use by the
legislature of the permissive word "may," rather than the word
"shall," left room for the exercise of sound judicial discretion.' 20 The
statute was amended, however, to provide that the prior convictions
110. See id. §28(0.
111. See infra notes 112-28 and accompanying text.
112. 6 Cal. 3d at 452, 492 P.2d at 7, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 319.
113. CAL. Evan. CODE §788.
114. See 6 Cal. 3d at 452, 492 P.2d at 7, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 319.
115. See CAL. CONST. art. I, §28(0.
116. Id.
117. See supra notes 42-50 and accompanying text.
118. 348 F.2d 763 (D.C. 1968).
119. See id. at 768, n.6.
120. See id. at 768.
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of a witness "shall be admitted if offered.' ' 21 Faced with the task
of interpreting the amended provision, a District of Columbia Court
of Appeals held that Congress, by removing the word "may" and
adopting a mandatory provision that prior convictions "shall be ad-
mitted if offered," effectively overruled the Luck doctrine. 22 The trial
court no longer had discretion to limit or prohibit impeachment of
witnesses with their prior convictions.' 23
A nearly identical situation exists in California. The Beagle deci-
sion was based on the premise that the California Legislature deliberately
used the word "may" in Evidence Code section 788 for the purpose
of permitting the trial court to exercise its discretion.'2 1 Once the
California voters adopted subdivision (f) substituting the word "shall,"
the justification for the rule announced in Beagle vanished. 21 An
analysis of subdivision (f), focusing on its plain language and employ-
ing extrinsic evidence to aid in its interpretation, clearly indicates that
the intent of the voters in adopting this provision was to overrule
People v. Beagle.' 26 This interpretation is also compelling in light of
the analogous situation in the District of Columbia. 27 Some litigants,
however, continue to insist that under subdivision (f), trial courts re-
main free to exercise their discretion to exclude evidence of prior felony
convictions. 28
B. Interpretation Based on Subdivisions (d) and (f)
The argument employed by these litigants is based on the conten-
tion that article I, section 28 of the California Constitution specifically
preserves Evidence Code section 352 as a basis for excluding unduly
prejudicial evidence. 29 Subdivision (d) specifically states that "nothing
in this section shall affect any existing statutory rule of evidence relating
to privilege or hearsay, or Evidence Code, Sections 352, 788, or 1103." 1°
The quoted language suggests that Evidence Code section 352 is ap-
plicable throughout section 28.' 31 Section 28 includes subdivision (f);
121. Act of July 29, 1976 Pub. L. No. 91-358, 84 Stat. 473. For the full text of the revi-
sion, see D.C. CODE ANN., 1967 (Supp. IV, 1978 at 276-77).
122. Taylor v. United States, 280 A.2d 79, 81 (1971).
123. Id.
124. See 6 Cal. 3d at 452, 492 P.2d at 7, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 319.
125. See id.
126. See supra notes 92-125 and accompanying text.
127. See supra notes 118-26 and accompanying text.
128. Appellant's Reply Brief at 7-8, People v. Broder, 3 Crim. 12446 (3d App. Dist., Sept.
1983) (copy on file at the Pacific Law Journal).
129. Id.
130. CAL. CONST. art. I, §28(d).
131. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
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therefore, the trial court retains discretion under Evidence Code sec-
tion 352 to exclude evidence of prior felony convictions when the risk
of prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value.'32 While the
language of subdivision (d), if read literally, would seem to support
this argument, the interpretation relied on fails for two reasons. First,
the argument is contrary to the intent of the voters as expressed above.
Second, the interpretation violates a well-settled rule of constitutional
construction. A basic rule of construction provides that when the two
provisions cannot be read harmoniously, a specific provision will con-
trol over a more general provision. 33 The first question in this analysis,
then, is whether subdivision (d) conflicts with subdivision (f).
Subdivision (d) states that relevant evidence shall not be excluded
in any criminal proceeding.134 The provision further provides that
Evidence Code section 352 is not affected by this section. 3 1 If sub-
division (d) is interpreted as making Evidence Code section 352 ap-
plicable to subdivision (f), a limitation on the use of prior felonies
for impeachment purposes would necessarily be imposed. 36 Since sub-
division (f) provides that prior felonies shall be used without limita-
tion, the provisions directly conflict.137 The specific provision, then,
will control over the general provision. 38
Subdivision (f) relates to the use of a particular type of evidence
(prior felony convictions) for a specified purpose (impeachment). 39
Subdivision (d), on the other hand, concerns the admissibility of
evidence, without reference to its nature or the purpose for which
the evidence is being introduced. 4 ° Subdivision (f), being more specific,
would control over subdivision (d);"14 therefore, subdivision (d) can-
not be read as making Evidence Code section 352 applicable to sub-
division (f).142
An interpretation of subdivision (f), employing well-settled rules of
constitutional construction has shown that the intent of the electorate
in adopting this provision was to overrule Beagle. Under subdivision
132. Id.
133. Warne v. Harkness, 60 Cal. 2d 579, 588, 387 P.2d 377, 382-83, 35 Cal. Rptr. 601, 606-07
(1963).
134. See CAL. CoNsr. art. I, §28(d).
135. Id.
136. See supra notes 54-64 and accompanying text.
137. See supra notes 134-36 and accompanying text.
138. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
139. See CAL. CoNsr. art. I, §28(f).
140. See id. §28(d).
141. See supra notes 133-40 and accompanying text.
142. Id.
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(f), the trial court no longer retains discretion to exclude evidence
of unduly prejudicial prior convictions. This conclusion, however, raises
serious constitutional questions. When the accused is subject to im-
peachment with prior felony convictions, due process requires the
utilization of procedures adequate to protect his right to a fair trial.
In the following section this author will establish that judicial discre-
tion is indispensible to the constitutionality of impeaching the defen-
dant with prior felony convictions.
DuE PRocEss
The defendant in a criminal proceeding has a fundamental right
to a fair trial."4 3 This right derives from the fourteenth amendment
to the United States Constitution which provides that no state shall
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law. " Due process is an elusive concept and is not subject to
exact definition.' 4 5 As applied to criminal proceedings, however, due
process requires that the trial proceed in a manner consistent with
the notion of fundamental fairness.14
6
Subdivision (f) compels the admission of the defendant's prior
felonies to impeach his credibility should he testify in his own behalf.
141
This includes evidence of extremely prejudicial prior convictions. 148
For example, in a prosecution for rape, the defendant's prior rape
conviction would be admissible to impeach his credibility. The in-
troduction of that identical prior conviction would be extremely
prejudicial.' 49 The jury would be under tremendous pressure to con-
vict the accused based solely on his prior conviction.' This pressure
would increase when the prosecutor's case is weak.' Moreover, the
protection afforded the accused by a limiting instruction would be
minimal.'5 2 "To inform the jury in a rape case that the defendant
has a prior conviction and then instruct them to consider the convic-
tion only in evaluating the defendant's credibility is to recommend
a mental gymnastic which is beyond, not only their power, but anybody
else's.'"153
143. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 31-34 (1972).
144. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1.
145. In re Tucker, 5 Cal. 3d 171, 179, 486 P.2d 657, 661, 95 Cal. Rptr. 761, 765 (1971).
146. Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941).
147. See supra notes 71-128 and accompanying text.
148. See CAL. CONST. art. I., §28(f).
149. See id.
150. See State v. Santiago, 492 P.2d 657, 660 (1971).
151. People v. Antick, 15 Cal. 3d 79, 97, 539 P.2d 43, 55, 123 Cal. Rptr. 475, 487 (1975).
152. See infra notes 180-200 and accompanying text.
153. State v. Santiago, 492 P.2d 657, 660 (1971).
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This comment posits that despite the use of limiting instructions, in-
troduction of highly prejudicial prior felony convictions operates to
deny the accused his right to fundamental fairness as guaranteed by
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 5 "
If the defendant is subject to impeachment with his prior convic-
tions, due process requires the utilization of procedures adequate to
protect his right to a fair trial. 55 In the impeachment situation, two
procedural devices are available to protect the interests of the
accused.1 16 The first, and perhaps most effective method of protect-
ing the accused, is the discretion resting in the trial court to exclude
evidence of prior crimes when the probative value is substantially
outweighed by the potential for prejudice. 57 The second method is
a limiting instruction to the jurors, directing them to consider the
prior felony conviction only in determining the issue of credibility.158
These two procedures, when used in conjunction with one another,
provide the only adequate means of protecting the accused from the
undeniable prejudice that results when his prior crimes are introduced
to impeach his credibility. 159
The United States Supreme Court has never directly held that the
constitutionality of impeaching the accused with his prior felony con-
victions requires that these procedures be employed. In Spencer v.
Texas, 6 ' the Court, in dicta, addressed the question of whether im-
peaching the accused with his prior convictions would deprive him
of due process of law under the fourteenth amendment.' 6' The Spencer
court upheld a state recidivist statute'62 from a constitutional attack. 63
The state procedure permitted evidence of the defendant's prior con-
viction to be considered by the jury in determining appropriate punish-
ment. The jury, however, was informed of the defendant's prior crimes
before the issue of guilt or innocence had been decided. In holding
that this procedure did not violate due process guarantees, the ma-
jority opinion analogized to other situations in which evidence of the
154. See infra notes 155-206 and accompanying text.
155. See Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1, 12 (1978).
156. See Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 561 (1967).
157. See, e.g., CAL. EvID. CODE §352.
158. See Generally Note, The Limiting Instruction - Its Effectiveness and Effect, 51 MNN.
L. REv. 264, 281-88 (1966).
159. See infra notes 160-206 and accompanying text.
160. 385 U.S. 554 (1967).
161. See id. at 560-63.
162. A recidivist or "habitual offender" statute permits the defendant's prior conviction(s)
for the same or similar offense to be considered by the jury in determining the punishment
for the subsequent conviction. See e.g., TEx. CODE ANN., PENAL (1974) §§12.42, 12.43.
163. 385 U.S. at 559-60.
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defendant's prior convictions had been admissible.'16  Recognizing the
prejudicial effect of prior convictions, the Court noted that evidence
of prior crimes is generally excluded unless (1) the evidence is pro-
bative of issues such as intent, identity, motive, or (2) the defendant has
testified and the state seeks to impeach his credibility. 61
The court pointed out that in those situations, the state interest
in admitting felony convictions could be reconciled with the inherent
possibility of prejudice.'6 6 This reconciliation was possible because cer-
tain procedures had developed to ensure that the defendant's interests
were protected: (1) the discretion of the trial court to exclude evidence
of prior claims when the evidence is particularly likely to be prejudicial,
and (2) the limiting instruction.' 67
Mr. Chief Justice Warren dissented, stating that the Texas recidivist
procedure was unconstitutional.' 68 The Chief Justice, however, agreed
with the majority concerning the validity of using prior convictions
to show intent, common design, or to impeach the credibility of the
defendant. 69 In the examples cited, the prior convictions were said
to be admissible because they were probative of issues other than the
accused's disposition to commit the crime charged. 7 ' The dissent em-
phasized that the admission of prior crimes was justified only when
the probative value of the evidence outweighed the inherent potential
for prejudice.' 7' The problem was said to be the "delicate one of
balancing the probative value against the possibility of prejudice....
This coincides with the observation of the majority that one of
the procedures that had developed to protect the defendant's in-
terest was the discretion of the trial court to limit the admissibility
of prior felony convictions.' 7 This discretion could be exercised to
limit or prohibit the admission of particularly prejudicial evidence.t74
Spencer has been read by California courts as foreclosing the argu-
ment that impeaching a defendant with his prior felony convictions
denies the accused fundamental fairness in a criminal trial.'7" As both
the majority and dissent in Spencer make clear, however, the con-
164. See id. at 560-62.
165. Id. at 560-61.
166. Id. at 562.
167. Id. at 561-62.
168. Id. at 570 (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
169. See id. at 576.
170. Id. at 570-75, 77.
171. Id. at 577-78.
172. Id. at 578.
173. Id. at 561.
174. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE §352.
175. See, e.g., People v. House, 12 Cal. App. 3d 756, 763, 90 Cal. Rptr. 831, 834 (1970).
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stitutional validity of using prior convictions to impeach the accused
depends on the existence of procedures adequate to protect the defen-
dant's right to a fair trial.1 76
The primary effect of subdivision (f), as discussed above, is to
remove the discretion of the trial court to exclude unduly prejudicial
evidence.' 77 Thus, one of the important procedural devices relied upon
in Spencer has been stripped away.1 78 The Spencer court also relied
heavily upon the use of limiting instructions to the jury as a means
of protecting the defendant from the undeniably prejudicial effect of
introducing prior convictions.1 9 The effectiveness of limiting instruc-
tions as a means of protecting the defendant from the prejudicial ef-
fects of prior crimes is highly suspect. 8 '
The United States Supreme Court in Bruton v. United States'8
acknowledged that a jury may be unable to follow instructions to
disregard improperly admitted hearsay evidence.'82 Bruton involved
the joint trial of a defendant and codefendant. The codefendant's
confession was admitted into evidence.183 Although the confession im-
plicated the defendant, the jury was instructed that the confession
was competent evidence against the codefendant only.'84 The confes-
sion was incompetent against the defendant and had to be disregarded
in determining the defendant's guilt or innocence.' The Court
recognized the existence of a substantial risk that the jury, despite
instructions to the contrary, would use the codefendant's confession
in determining the defendant's guilt. '86
The fact of the matter is that too often such admonition against
misuse is intrinsically ineffective in that the effect of such an inad-
missible declaration cannot be wiped from the brains of the jurors.
The admonition therefore becomes a futile collocation of words and
fails in its purpose as a legal protection to defendants. . . . 87
Bruton v. United States is not the only case demonstrating the distrust
of the Court for the limiting instruction as a means of protecting
the defendant from undue prejudice. In Krulewitch v. United States,'88
176. See supra notes 160-74 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 71-142 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 167-74, 177 and accompanying text.
179. 385 U.S. at 561-63.
180. See infra notes 180-200 and accompanying text.
181. 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
182. Id. at 126-29.
183. Id. at 124.
184. Id. at 123-24.
185. Id. at 125.
186. Id. at 126.
187. Id. at 129 (quoting the dissent in Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232, 267 (1956)).
188. 336 U.S. 440 (1949).
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Justice Jackson, in his concurring opinion stated: "The naive assump-
tion that prejudicial effects can be overcome by instructions to the
jury... all practicing lawyers know to be unmitigated fiction .... "1 19
The skepticism of the Court concerning the effectiveness of the
limiting instructions is supported by a number of empirical studies.' 90
One survey polled a group of trial judges and criminal defense
attorneys. 19' These individuals were asked whether juries were able
to follow instructions directing them to consider evidence of prior
crimes only on the issue of the accused's credibility, and not as evidence
of his guilt. 92 Ninety-eight percent of the attorneys and forty-three
percent of the judges responding to the survey answered in the
negative.' 93
The California Supreme Court also has expressed doubt concern-
ing the effectiveness of limiting instructions, particularly in the im-
peachment situation. 94 In People v. Antick,9 5 the prosecution, dur-
ing cross-examination, questioned the defendant regarding his prior
forgery convictions.' 96 The court held that the trial court had abused
its discretion in permitting nineteen and seventeen year old prior con-
victions to be introduced to impeach the credibility of the defendant.' 97
The court noted that, in this situation, the jury was likely to consider
the prior conviction as proof that the accused was the type of person
willing to engage in unlawful activities, and therefore probably com-
mitted the crimes in question.1 98
While we do not intimate that the jury intentionally ignored the trial
court's instruction limiting use of this evidence to impeachment pur-
poses, we are of the view that ...a (d)iscrimination so subtle is
a feat beyond the compass of ordinary minds . . . It is for ordinary
minds, not for psychoanalysts, that our rules of evidence are framed. 99
Clearly, the jury cannot limit its consideration of prior convic-
tions to the issue of credibility. 200 Furthermore, limiting instructions,
so heavily relied upon in Spencer to protect the defendant's interests,
actually afford the accused little protection from the inherent pre-
189. Id. at 453 (Jackson, J., concurring).
190. See KvLaVN & ZEISEL, THE AmascA JuaY 127-30, 177-80 (empirical study of jury
behavior and limiting instructions); see also supra note 27, at 218.
191. See Note, supra note 27, at 218.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. See, e.g., People v. Antick, 15 Cal. 3d 79, 98, 539 P.2d 43, 55-56 123 Cal. Rptr. 475,
487-88 (1975).
195. Id.
196. Id. at 96, 539 P.2d at 54, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 486.
197. Id. at 99, 539 P.2d at 56, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 488.
198. Id. at 98, 539 P.2d at 56, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 488.
199. Id.
200. See supra notes 190-99 and accompanying text.
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judicial effect.20 ' The Court noted that the introduction of prior con-
victions for certain valid purposes, such as proving intent, motive,
or impeaching the defendant's credibility, was justified. The law of
evidence had developed procedures adequate to reconcile the interest
of the state in admitting this evidence with the conceded possibility
of prejudice. 20 2 As demonstrated, however, th6 ineffectiveness of
limiting instructions as a means of protecting the defendant from the
prejudicial effect of his prior criminal acts is well recognized.2 3 Clearly,
then, some additional procedural device is necessary to protect the
defendant's right to a fair trial.20 ' The one other procedure relied
upon by the Spencer Court was the discretion residing in the trial
judge to limit the introduction of particularly prejudicial evidence. 211
As discussed above, however, the primary effect of subdivision (f)
is to divest the trial judge of this discretion.20 6 Under subdivision (f),
therefore, no adequate procedural device is available to protect the
defendant's right to due process.
CONCLUSION
The passage of Proposition 8 has necessitated a reexamination of
the long-standing procedure of impeaching the accused with his prior
convictions. This examination has shown that the use of prior con-
victions to impeach the accused involves a risk that the jury will not
limit its use of this evidence to the issue of credibility. Instead, the
jury may use the evidence for either of two legally impermissible pur-
poses: (1) determining that the defendant has a criminal disposition
and should be incarcerated for that reason alone, or (2) as evidence
that the accused committed the crime charged. In an effort to pro-
tect the defendant from this prejudice, the California Supreme Court,
in People v. Beagle, held that the trial judge had discretion to ex-
clude evidence of prior felony convictions when the possibility of pre-
judice substantially outweighed the probative value.
An interpretation of subdivision (f), employing well-settled rules of
constitutional construction, has revealed that the primary effect of
the provision is to divest the trial court of its discretion. This conclu-
sion, however, is not without important constitutional ramifications.
The United States Supreme Court, in Spencer v. Texas, addressed
the constitutionality of impeaching the accused with prior convictions.
201. See supra notes 180-200 and accompanying text.
202. 385 U.S. at 560-61.
203. See supra notes 180-200 and accompanying text.
204. See supra notes 155, 180-200 and accompanying text.
205. 385 U.S. at 561.
206. See supra notes 71-142 and accompanying text.
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The Court concluded that the fourteenth amendment did not bar the
use of prior convictions to impeach the accused. In so stating, however,
the Court recognized that certain safeguards had developed to pro-
tect the defendant's right to a fair trial: limiting instructions and
judicial discretion.
This comment has demonstrated the inadequacy of the limiting in-
struction as a method of protecting the defendant's interests. Moreover,
the use of judicial discretion as a means of excluding particularly pre-
judicial evidence has been foreclosed by subdivision (f). As a prac-
tical matter, then, no adequate procedure is available in California
to protect the defendant's right to a fair trial in this situation. Spencer,
therefore, should no longer be read by California courts as foreclos-
ing the argument that impeaching the accused with prior convictions
deprives him of fundamental fairness under the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment.
Robert Lyle Chortek
